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Abstract 
Using contemporary insights from feminist critical theory and the literary device of 
synecdoche, we argue that transdisciplinary knowledge is productive because it 
maximizes serendipity. We draw on student learning experiences in a course on “Gender 
and Science” to illustrate how the dichotomous frameworks and part-whole 
correspondences that are predominant in much disciplinary discourse must be dismantled 
for innovative intellectual work to take place. In such a process, disciplinary 
presumptions interrogate and unsettle one another to produce novel questions and 
answers.  
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1. Making Room for Surprise  
Acknowledging the agency of the world . . . makes room for . . . the world’s 
independent sense of humor. . . . Feminist objectivity makes room for 
surprises and ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not in 
charge of the world. (Haraway, 1988, pp. 593-594)  
Page 1 of 13 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
The call for papers for this special issue identified “a mismatch between our current 
inherited structures for organizing knowledge (the combination of conceptual, 
methodological, and institutional forms that comprise disciplines),” and transdisciplinary 
ways of pursuing new knowledge. We are responding to that call with an examination of 
the multifaceted relationship that exists between the observations we make of the world 
and the generalizations we make based on those observations. We offer here a 
perspective on how knowledge gets generated in transdisciplinary transactions, one that 
rests neither on singular relations between various parts, nor on a presumed congruence 
between parts and wholes.  
We write out of our experiences as faculty members at a small liberal arts college in the 
USA; one of us is a molecular physicist, the other a feminist literary theorist. Ten years 
ago we taught together a first-semester writing seminar; we have just finished co-teaching 
a second course on gender and science. As we moved from teaching composition to first-
year students to exploring ontological, epistemological, and methodological claims with 
more advanced undergraduates, we acquired a way to think about knowledge production 
that highlights both the settled quality of disciplinary frameworks and the productively 
unpredictable effect of putting them into conversation with one another.  
Our thinking about this conversation draws on three sources: one theoretical, one 
experiential, one symbolic. The first is the contemporary feminist critique of the 
conviction that “the natural sciences can produce impartial, disinterested, value-neutral 
accounts of a nature completely separate from human history” (Harding, 1991, p. 81). 
The second is our recent experiment of putting such theories into play with eight upper-
level students in a class on “Gender and Science” at Bryn Mawr College, USA, during 
the academic year 2006-2007. Our third source is the concept of synecdoche, which is 
both specific to the discipline of literary studies and more generally useful as an image of 
the underdetermined relationship between parts and their wholes.  
Drawing on these three sources, we argue that a key component of transdisciplinary 
knowledge production is that it foregrounds the shattering of conventional wholes. 
Transdisciplinarity highlights the inadequacy of one-to-one correspondences between 
paired concepts, and demonstrates that parts and wholes are not necessarily congruent. 
Accordingly, the moves between them will always be underdetermined, and the results of 
those moves always a surprise.  
2. Meeting the Universe Halfway  
Nature has agency, but it does not speak itself. . . . There is an important 
asymmetry. . . . we do the representing. (Barad, 1996, p. 181)  
When we designed our course on “Reenvisioning & Revising the Relation Between 
Gender and Science,” we used the field of quantum mechanics as exemplar, and 
contemporary novels and films as imaginative test cases. Our defining idea was the 
presumption of congruence between the epistemological implications of modern physics 
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and feminist critiques of the longstanding “inability of Western knowledges to conceive 
their own processes of material production” (Grosz, 1993, p. 196).  
Learning from a molecular physicist about the ways in which our measurements of 
probabilistic, nondeterminant phenomena are influenced, both conceptually and 
physically, by our observations, our students began to recognize the degree to which 
feminist standpoint epistemologies correspond to the insights of modern physics 
(Harding, 1986, p. 141). Our role as observers makes us part of the experiment and 
therefore part of the measurement, not just a perturbation, but a determinant in 
phenomenological outcome:  
We cannot avoid the condition of our participation. . . . in Heisenberg’s words, “the 
scientific method of analyzing, [defining] and classifying has become conscious . . . that 
by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation.” (Lukacs, 
1994/2001, p. 230)  
Throughout the semester, we interspersed explanations of contemporary quantum theory 
with texts that included accounts of Keller’s dynamic objectivity (1985), Haraway’s 
situated knowledges (1988), Longino’s contextual empiricism (1990), Harding’s strong 
objectivity (1991), and Barad’s agential realism (1996). These forms of nonrelativist 
constructivism are all congruent with the understandings of quantum mechanics; they are 
also critical of commonly held notions of both identity and science. They are central, too, 
to the sorts of scientific and political agency that the intersection of science and feminist 
theory both encourages and enables.  
As we explored this material together, we realized that we were two second-wave 
feminists, finding repeated correction in the minds, and at the hands, of our third-wave 
students. These young women persistently recognized the fundamental ambiguities 
inherent in our terms and categories (for a survey of the different “waves” of feminism, 
see Tong, 1998). The students were thereby demonstrating that “knowledges are not 
innocent representations, but intra-actions of natures-cultures” (Barad, 1996, p. 189). The 
unpredictable outcomes of such intra-actions helped us to understand why and how 
transdisciplinary work can be so generative of new ideas.  
3. Breaking the Binary  
Our students’ interventions repeatedly altered the terms around which we had structured 
our conversations. We highlight here only the first instance of what soon became a 
persistent pattern. We opened the initial class by inviting our students to describe, 
sequentially, their experiences of being scientists, of being women, and of being women 
scientists: What were the physical objects and activities they associated with each of 
these experiences? What, in each case, were their interactions with and manipulations of 
the world? What were the physical and intellectual attributes of each? How did the 
experiences of being a scientist and being a woman resemble and differ from one 
another?  
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The paired options we had so carefully used to construct this exercise broke down very 
quickly. We had intended to contrast the historical, stereotypical “or” relationship 
between the categories “woman” and “scientist” with the “and” relation indicated in our 
course title and conception. But it became quite clear, before we had finished even the 
first round of responses, that the simplicity of the binary connectors (“and” and “or”) was 
not going to encompass either our students’ experiences or their reflections on them.  
A social science major refused the category “scientist.” A transgender student refused the 
category “woman.” An independent major in Gender and Sexuality refused to 
acknowledge a boundary between science and politics: “the very act of finding things out 
can itself be a political act,” she wrote in the course forum; “choosing what questions to 
ask in science and what is important enough to be funded are social, political, as well as 
scientific decisions.”  
Under the tutelage of such students, we soon realized how ironic it was that we had 
designed a third-wave interdisciplinary course around a second-wave disciplinary 
practice of dualistic knowledge frames. Our students’ questions and new observations 
repeatedly shattered any dualistic sense-making. Adding a variety of perspectives and 
new dimensions, the students refused one-to-one-correspondences between paired 
concepts. They repeatedly broke “dualisms, binary oppositions, dichotomies, and other 
demarcations” (Barad, 1996, p. 163). The collision of our paired constructions with our 
students’ real world diversities gave rise to multiple manifestations, far more complex 
than the dichotomous structures within which we had framed the course.  
4. Questioning the Congruence  
Our students not only disrupted our dualistic constructions; they also showed us how 
selective our mapping techniques were, how underdetermined were our moves from part 
to whole. For example, they repeatedly critiqued any simple correlation between the 
activities of collecting, organizing, and analyzing data, and what they were willing to 
identify as the practice of science. The second day of class, for instance, we were 
discussing a dialogue that claimed to explain “the science behind the relation between 
gender and science” (Pinker & Spelke, 2005). The students immediately put the category 
“science” itself under interrogation, refusing it the status of a bounded and knowable 
object. How can you tell when it is a scientist talking? How do you adjudicate when 
scientists offer different interpretations of the same data? What role does gender play, in 
the different positions taken by different scientists? What differentiates a moral from an 
empirical claim? Can the truth be sexist?  
A later discussion focused on an essay by Evelyn Fox Keller on “Cognitive Repression in 
Contemporary Physics” (1985) and another by Sandra Harding on “Why ‘Physics’ is a 
Bad Model for Physics” (1991). The students then expanded further on the problems 
encountered in attributing a correspondence between society (the whole) and science (a 
part within it). One student strongly endorsed Harding’s claim that “the model for good 
science should be research programs explicitly directed by liberatory political goals” 
(Harding, 1991, p. 98). She argued in the course forum that “science research and 
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development . . . must be refocused so that the lives of less advantaged people, who are 
the majority, will be benefited.”  
Another student took a counter-position, arguing that a pursuit of “pure science” was 
likely to be more productive, if not bound either to specific social goals or to the hubris of 
thinking that we can predict what will happen. A third student broke the symmetry of this 
opposition, by suggesting, first, that science exists not in opposition to society, but as part 
of it; second, that the relationship between part and whole was neither simple or 
harmonious. She reminded us of the “long, sad history” of using “social value” as a 
standard from which to judge and fund the work of science. As an example, we 
considered Stephen Jay Gould’s critique of biological determinism in The Mismeasure of 
Man (1986): how reliance on physical brain size as a measure of intelligence and human 
worth was used to support perpetuate social and economic differences.  
But perhaps the most delightful illustration of our students’ challenge to the presumed 
congruence of parts and wholes was an essay in which a physics major traced the process 
of writing a haiku, a minimalist form of poetry of Japanese origin. We include the essay 
in full in the following section, because it so well demonstrates the revisability inherent in 
the reciprocal loop between words and the large range of their possible allusions, 
associations, and meanings (Dalke, Grobstein, McCormack, 2006). None of the word 
choices that went into making the haiku was predictable before it was made, nor were the 
range of associations evoked by each word knowable ahead of time.  
5. “Apple Blossom Journey: A Path to Feminizing Physics”--An Essay 
by Megan Stegall  
I remembered the joke I’d made in class . . . that a single haiku wouldn’t 
exactly equate to five pages of writing. 
  
That was, perhaps, untrue. I also remembered what [one of my professors] 
had said in reply, that a haiku filled with words of the right weight could in 
that sense perfectly fit the bill. All this remembering happened as I was 
walking across campus, and simultaneously thinking about how I’m really 
going to miss the weeping cherry trees when I graduate.  
 
Cherry blossoms fall  
Gently back to their mother  
Female gravity  
 
Well, how’s that? Does it weigh enough? Somehow it didn’t feel right (how 
much of writing is feeling, and how much thinking? I mean, if we’re bodied 
individuals and not just floating intellectualism . . .) and I decided to play 
with it. The first thing that occurred to me was that it would be more potent 
for this case to speak of apple blossoms, since--although it was the cherry 
trees that inspired me--it was allegedly an apple that inspired Sir Isaac 
Newton.  
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I had written this short poem down in a little notebook I carry, since I was 
headed off on the bus to a class . . . and knew that I wouldn’t remember it on 
my own. So I reopened my notebook and wrote, below the first one, a 
slightly different version, playing with some more of the words.  
 
Apple blossoms drift  
Gently down to their mother  
Female gravity  
 
Still not quite right. I liked the apple--makes me think simultaneously of Sir 
Newton and Eve, since it was her famous fruit, too, and I learned both their 
stories in early childhood. “Drift” wasn’t right, though, as it implied a 
purposelessness I couldn’t identify with. “Fall” was better, it seemed, both 
because of the Eve reference and because fall is, of course, the season of 
harvest, which feels traditionally feminine to me. I guess I’m thinking of all 
those Earth-Mother goddess types and the classical image of my own zodiac 
sign, Virgo, as a woman holding a sheaf of grain or wheat.  
 
I also was now no longer sure about “gently.” Most of the women I know I 
would not describe as gentle, although I’m aware it’s a stereotype of 
women. I think "graceful" is more appropriate, both for the motion of the 
flowers and for the women I know. I also like this word because it feels 
closer in meaning to "elegant," which (while not the best description of 
homey, comfortable apple blossoms, I think) is a term we often use in 
physics to describe mathematics . . . and which we use in the rest of the 
world to describe women.  
 
Apple blossoms fall  
Graceful down to their mother . . .  
 
Now I’m starting to have issues with “down” and “mother,” since I don’t 
want to associate this feminine motion with a lowering or moving down 
(hierarchy?), and “gravity” may have done that already, and I’m intensely 
aware of the masculine critique that a feminizing of physics might lose some 
of the mathematical rigor for which physics is famous. I don’t want to sound 
too . . . well, too much like a math-phobic hippie, so to speak, a stereotype 
I’ve also fought. Anyway, thinking about the physicist’s use of "elegant" 
made me want to use something distinctively mathematical in this poem, 
and since I know gravity makes objects move in interesting parabolic 
shapes, I rewrite the second line.  
 
Apple blossoms fall  
Graceful wind parabolas  
Female gravity  
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To be honest I got the word “wind” just by needing one more syllable for 
that line . . . but I’m starting to really like it, because it means both the 
breeze pushing the blossoms, which leads to a more complex motion, and 
because it could indicate that motion itself, in a spiral, winding kind of way. 
In fact, I’ll keep it because of that dualism on the page, because any 
empirical data can and must be interpreted from more than one perspective 
for understanding. Plus, of course, the complexity of motion influenced by 
both gravity and friction from wind implies a more holistic understanding of 
motion--no one-dimensional ball-dropping here!  
 
I like parabolas here--they’re one of the most simple and familiar non-linear 
functions in math, and one of the first things one learns in any algebra or 
precalculus math class; so they’re very accessible, but since they do really 
describe the motion of an object influenced by gravity, they are also very 
important to classical mechanics. They are, in that way, both fundamental 
and far-reaching.  
 
Now that last line is beginning to bother me. It’s too confining--for a poem 
that touches on Newton and Eve, simplicity (haiku) and complexity (holistic 
motion), duplicity of meaning in a single word, and the vast functionality of 
a single function (math function, that is, the parabola), I don’t want to limit 
myself to gravity. Let’s try physics, with a syllable change.  
 
Apple blossoms fall  
Graceful wind parabolas  
Feminine physics  
 
I like that better. The more I read it, the more I dwell on it, the more I see in 
it. Apples for Isaac and Eve, for knowledge either given mysteriously (by 
God?) or taken, maybe without knowing the consequences but daring to ask 
anyway. Blossoms for femininity--fragile perhaps, beautiful certainly, and 
terribly useful (reproduction, of course). Fall for Eve’s fall, for autumn, 
maybe for the descent of physics from the top of that pyramid we deny so 
strongly, falling to a level where everyone can be equal.  
 
Grace is a woman’s name; graceful a feminine adjective. Full of grace, 
perhaps another gift from God, perhaps just the inner peace that comes with 
communing with the universe as we see it, as we can understand and interact 
with it. Wind blows through those blossoms, which then wind their way to 
the earth, interacting and exchanging energy with the tiniest molecules of 
air. Beautiful parabolas erase the classic classroom examples of cannonballs 
and football players and replace it with something more primal, perhaps 
more real, than our weapons and games.  
 
Feminine physics. More complex, more holistic, more useful, more 
beautiful, more accessible than the kind of elite priesthood we have all 
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encountered before. I really thought about simply submitting my final haiku 
as my paper, and while each of you might have read it through and through 
and through and thought about it and come to a unique, deep, rich 
understanding of its phenomenological meaning (because every word is a 
phenomenon in our agential perception, right?), that would have also been 
shutting you out of my process. It would have set me apart as The Author, 
another priesthood just as cut off from the world as physics can be. So I 
asked you to join me on my apple blossom journey, and add my meaning to 
your own to create a deeper, richer, wider understanding than I, or any 
Author, could come up with alone. (Stegall, 2007)  
Stegall’s essay is a narrative of how a haiku evolved: the history of its accidents 
becoming intentions, and of the revisions that emerged from that dynamic, as well as an 
account of a range of possible interpretations. In offering both poem and interpretation, 
the essay illustrates the unpredictability of the intellectual activity we have been framing 
here. It describes multiple serendipitous interactions and the surprising configurations 
that arise from them. It is unhesitating in expressing novel associations among parts, 
which lead, in turn, to new meanings of the whole. This dynamic continued in our 
responses to Stegall, in which we probed the limits of her word choices “graceful” and 
“feminine,” insisting that the process not come to an end.  
Other student essays were as varied as their disciplinary training, which ranged from 
anthropology through biology, gender studies, physics, and psychology. Laying these 
different lenses alongside one another and layering them atop one another had the effect 
of creating what Barad calls a “‘diffractive’ method of analysis”: “not merely one of 
reflexivity, but rather . . . an exploration of the difference that different boundary-drawing 
practices make” (Barad, 1996, p. 189). Barad’s own project highlights “different 
interpretations . . . as diffracted through different understandings of science” (Barad, 
2000, p. 245). Our diffractions and those of our students, arrived at by drawing on a range 
of perspectives from the social sciences and humanities, revealed provocative 
multidimensional patterns of knowledge.  
6. Synecdoche and Surprise  
In writing her haiku, and the essay that traces its evolution, Stegall was searching for an 
evocative phrase to represent her experience of “feminine physics.” What she created was 
a synecdoche, which is a literary term for a figure of speech that uses a representative 
term to express a whole--for example, head for cattle, or hands for workers. “All hands 
on deck,” for instance, is a synecdoche commanding every sailor to report to duty; calling 
those same men “old salts” alludes to the larger brine in which their ship sails. When 
Stegall chose “apple” to evoke the history of Newton’s experiments with gravity, she was 
constructing a synecdoche in accord with the same logic: using a part to call to mind the 
whole.  
It is our claim here that the creative aspects of intellectual activity involve similar acts of 
synecdoche: constituted either by a gesture that names a whole in terms of one of its 
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parts, or by one that identifies a part in terms of its whole. What is key in this 
understanding, and key to our understanding of the usefulness of transdisciplinary work, 
is the underdetermined and non-congruent nature of this relationship: the part, or 
representation, will never reflect or encompass the whole of an event.  
Literary critics understand synecdoche (and its variants, metaphor and metonymy) not as 
reliably representing any whole, but rather only--and often times deliberately--selected 
aspects of it. Synecdoche is always “value constituting” (Richardson, 1997, p. 45); any 
synecdoche frames our understanding in a “distinctive yet partial” way (Morgan, 1986, p. 
13). Working within the synecdochal presumptions of a single discipline, however, we 
may sometimes forget the limited and unreliable nature of our representations. Working 
within scientific disciplines that emphasize the discovery of the predicted, for instance, 
we might be particularly likely to miss seeing the unpredicted.  
Thinking synecdochally also highlights the commonality between quantitative and 
qualitative inquiry. Scientists may study a part in order to understand the whole, with a 
sample standing in for a larger population. Humanists may use a whole to represent a 
part, using generic conventions, for example, to interpret a particular work of art. All 
inquirers are searching for a good theory that is capable of making sense of available 
representative data.  
In Once Upon a Number, mathematician John Paulos (1998) describes the gap between 
stories and statistics as a synecdoche for the better-known gap between literary and 
scientific cultures. He suggests that the world is a contest between complicators 
(humanists, storytellers) and simplifiers (scientists, statisticians)--also known as lumpers 
and splitters (Paulos, 1998, p. 16). Instead, we see the relation between humanists and 
scientists as a collaborative rather than a competitive enterprise, and recognize both 
complexification and simplification as activities that operate across all disciplines.  
There is of course a long-standing debate about whether meaning is best made by 
lumping or by splitting, a debate that recalls the distinction between inducing patterns 
from observations and deducing consequences from starting postulates. Our own 
perspective is that knowledge is made by a reciprocal loop between induction and 
deduction (Dalke, Grobstein, & McCormack, 2006, Figure 1). Newton built his theory of 
gravity out of known facts about the behavior of material bodies. Einstein reversed the 
procedure, adopting certain principles of invariance, from which he then derived the laws 
of relativity. But neither Newton nor Einstein simply induced or deduced; each induced 
an alternative and then deduced its implications.  
7. Maximizing Serendipity  
The reason that knowledge is generated in such looping action between parts and wholes 
is that both our brains (as Stegall’s creation of surprising new images suggests) and the 
world (as quantum physics and complexity theory tell us) are inherently 
underdetermined. Further, multiple interpretations are always available, both for words 
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and things. There is never only one way to represent what happens or one way to interpret 
that representation.  
Feminist theorists have long argued for the situatedness of knowledge; they have 
advanced multiple, compelling arguments for the need to be politically aware of the 
epistemic injustice of excluding particular points of view, and the epistemic advantage of 
including them (see, for example, Barad, 1996; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Keller, 
1985; Longino, 1990; Wylie, 2003). Our claim here adds another dimension to this 
argument, one that draws on contemporary understandings about the biological variability 
of brain function (Grobstein, 1994). On a larger scale, it might be said to be evolutionary, 
in accordance with contemporary theories of emergence, in which unpredictability and 
complexity arise out of the repeated action of a simple set of rules (cf. Center for Science 
in Society, 2006). There is of course a long tradition in philosophy recognizing “the 
limitations of inductive thought” and “impossibility of deriving universals from 
collections of observations”:  
It is not only that universals require an infinite number of observations, but 
also that any finite set of observations is consistent with multiple 
conceivable universals . . . the organization of the brain is such that it itself 
contains, at any given time, not one set of understandings but a variety of 
them. . . . If there exist non-deterministic process in the world, it follows that 
conclusions made inductively from observations must always be held 
tentatively since an inconsistent future observation is always possible. 
Similarly, any conclusions based on reduction of observations to date to 
“first principles” and deduction needs also to be understood as subject to 
reconsideration and revision. (Grobstein, 2007a; see also Grobstein, 2007b)  
In The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, a contemporary book 
exploring how we might better handle the increasingly unpredictable world in which we 
find ourselves, Nassim Taleb argues that our human insistence on reducing the 
dimensions of complexity, imposing order on chaos, and identifying causes for the effects 
we observe around us can--increasingly does--have explosive consequences. This urge to 
simplify “rules out sources of uncertainty and drives us to a misunderstanding of the 
fabric of the world” (Taleb, 2007, p. 16). Given the high impact of the highly improbable, 
we need to cultivate much more skeptical empiricism; that is, to resist the tendency to 
make generalizations based on limited observations. Many of Taleb’s exhortations accord 
with those that are repeatedly explored, often advocated, in science classes: “Doubt 
everything.” “Fight against dogma.” Shed the idea that linear predictable phenomena are 
the norm. Most striking, though, is his insistence that we can benefit from the 
unpredictability of the world, if we are willing to “maximize the serendipity” around 
ourselves (Taleb, 2007, p. 204).  
It is our argument here that transdisciplinary work is indeed a very effective way of 
maximizing serendipity. It is also a way of answering the now decades-old request of 
Evelyn Fox Keller that we “formulate a cognitive paradigm adequate” to our 
contemporary engagement with and comprehension of the world. “What is required,” 
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Keller insists, “is a paradigm that . . . acknowledges the inevitable interaction between 
knower and known, and . . . respects the equally inevitable gap between theory and 
phenomenon” (Keller, 1985, p. 139).  
The first aspect of the unpredictable nature of the project of constructing knowledge is 
that the action of the knower alters what we know. The second is that the interpretations 
available to us as knowers are always multiple, always various. It is because of these two 
forms of unpredictability that transdisciplinary work--which keeps unsettling assumptions 
about what counts, what should be foregrounded, what needs to be attended to--can be so 
generative.  
Elsewhere in this issue, across a range of different cuts, contributors identify useful 
distinctions among extra-, trans-, bridging, multi-, cross-, and inter-disciplinary practices. 
Our own claim for transdisciplinary knowledge production foregrounds the shattering of 
conventional wholes. The observer experiences the fluidity of boundaries between herself 
and the world. Dualisms break down, as one-to-one correspondences between paired 
concepts prove inadequate. Parts and wholes are not necessarily congruent, and the 
moves between them are underdetermined. We have learned from experience how the 
transdisciplinary activities of breaking down and reconstructing ideas can result in 
surprising and innovative ways of making sense of the world.  
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